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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
soned that if the ten-day period is indeed a statute of limitations, then
the movant should be afforded a full ten days in which to act.
In Knickerbocker Insurance Co. v. Gilbert17 6 the opposite position
was taken by the Appellate Division, First Department. A notice of in-
tention to arbitrate was served on December 1, 1969. On December 11,
petitioner posted by certified mail a notice of petition for a stay of ar-
bitration which was received on the following day. Service was deemed
untimely on the ground that the moving papers were not received
within ten days after service of the notice of intention to arbitrate.
The court compared the situation at hand to cases holding that the
ten-day period did not begin to run until the notice of intention to ar-
bitrate was actually received 177 and concluded that since the legislature
employed identical language in both parts of CPLR 7503(c) the con-
structions should be identical. In so doing, the court utilized cases
which attempted to afford the practitioner a full ten days in which to
act as a postulate for an outcome which drastically reduces the number
of days in which to act. But, practical considerations were of little im-
port to the court inasmuch as "[e]xpediency and convenience have no
place in determining questions of jurisdiction."'178
In view of the stringent constructions placed on CPLR 7503(c), 170
it is extremely unfortunate that the Knickerbocker court refused to
offer some relief to the belabored practitioner. It would have facilitated
greatly the processing of an application to stay arbitration if the First
Department had sanctioned a procedure whereby the attorney could
mail the moving papers on the tenth day and use the return receipt as
evidence that they were in fact mailed on that date. As the law stands
under Knickerbocker, the attorney must either mail his moving papers
at least three days before the expiration of the ten-day period or aban-
don the mailing provision altogether in favor of personal delivery.
NEw YoRK CITY CIVIL COURT Aar
CCA 404: Execution within New York City of contract to send child to
summer camp is not a transaction of business.
"CCA § 404 is CPLR § 302, tailored to fit the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court."'80 It follows, therefore, that case law arising under CPLR
176 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't 1970).
177 See cases cited note 171 supra.
178 35 App. Div. 2d at 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
179 See, e.g., Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898,
249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969); General Accident & Life Assurance Corp. v.
Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969).
180 29A MCKINNEY CCA, commentary at 103 (1963).
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302 serves as a useful reference in civil court cases.'81 Unfortunately, the
construction problems arising in the supreme court under the CPLR
are also encountered by the civil court in interpreting its own long-arm
provision. For example, the New York City Civil Court in Crystal Lake
Camp Corp. v. Silver 82 was confronted with a recurring question: what
type of activity constitutes "business" under the long-arm statute?
In Crystal Lake the parties had executed a contract at plaintiff's
office in Queens whereby defendant, a Nassau County resident, agreed
to send her son to plaintiff's summer camp in upstate New York. Defen-
dant reneged; plaintiff sued. In granting defendant's motion to dismiss
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court proferred two
reasons: the defendant had not purposely availed herself of the privi-
lege of conducting business in New York City, and the transaction be-
tween the parties was devoid of any real business characteristics.
As mentioned above, plaintiff's camp was located outside New
York City. Thus, nothing other than the signing of the contract in
Queens connected the transaction with the forum. And, the court re-
garded this singular event as insufficient, in and of itself, to constitute
a transaction of business within New York City,183 particularly because
the locus of execution was wholly fortuitous; there was little doubt that
the contract would have been signed at defendant's residence had she
so desired. Accordingly, the court concluded that defendant had not
met the purposeful availment criterion established in Hanson v. Den-
ckla. 84
While the first aspect of the court's decision was well reasoned and
sound, the validity of the second ground for dismissal is debatable. Fo-
cusing on the word "business" in the long-arm statute, the court under-
took to determine whether "those whose activities within the concerned
jurisdiction are not profit-making or commercial in character"'8 5 are
subject to jurisdiction under CCA 404(a)(1). In the process of deciding
that defendant's conduct did not constitute "business" within the mean-
ing of CCA 404(a), the court distinguished cases involving separation
agreements8 0 on the ground that they are based on "very distinct con-
181 Similarly, CPLR 302 case law is applicable in cases arising under the district
court's long-arm statute, UDCA 404.
182 63 Misc. 2d 562, 313 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
183 The court thus heeded the following admonition: "Care should be taken against
placing too much stock in the place where the contract is executed .... " 7B McKINEY'S
CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 137 (1965). See also M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc.
v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Ist Dep't), aft'd, 29
N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d 864, 285 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1966); A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA, 24
App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966).
184 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
185 63 Misc. 2d at 563, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
186 Courts have recognized the commercial aspects of a seperation agreement and have
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siderations implicit in the matrimonial area."' 87 Next, Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc. v. Franklynl8 was distinguished inasmuch as it con-
cerned "a prolonged course of competitive bidding to acquire valuable
objects,... at a total price of $96,000."18 9
The distinction between Crystal Lake and earlier cases is not so
readily perceived. Although the decisions have not been without op-
position,190 courts have recognized the commercial nature of separation
agreements despite the absence of a profit motive.19 And, in Parke-Ber-
net the Court of Appeals intimated that one need not be in business in
order to be deemed to have transacted business. Moreover, CPLR 302
has been extended so far as to secure jurisdiction over the donees of a
gift.192 In short, there is no indication that the long-arm statute is con-
fined to corporate enterprise effecting profit through commercial trans-
actions in the forum.
Notwithstanding the failure to discern what could possibly be
deemed a business transaction, Crystal Lake should withstand appellate
attack. The decision that defendant had not transacted business in New
York City is in accord with those cases holding that domestic execution
of a contract is not the sole criterion for determining whether a defen-
dant has transacted business in the forum.193 Moreover, the conse-
quence of the court's holding is minimized by the fact that plaintiff is
not compelled thereby to undergo the expense of out-of-state litigation;
it can either sue in Nassau County or commence its action in the New
York County Supreme Court. 94
sustained jurisdiction in such circumstances. See Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 52 Misc. 2d
437, 275 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966); Raschitore v. Fountain, 52 Misc.
2d 402, 275 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966) (dictum); Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc.
2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966) (dictum).
187 63 Misc. 2d at 564, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
188 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.-.2d 506, 308 N.YS.2d 337 (1970), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 145, 147 (1970).
189 63 Misc. 2d at 565, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 71. The Crystal Lake court was of the opinion
that whether the defendant in Parke-Bernet had purchased the paintings for pleasure or
investment was immaterial. Instead, the court focused primarily on the fact that the
paintings cost $96,000. However, it should be noted that huge claims are without the
jurisdiction of the civil court and the enormity of a claim vis-A-vis constituting a
transaction of business must be viewed on a much smaller scale.
100 See Whitaker v. Whitaker, 56 Misc. 2d 625, 289 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. Ulster
County 1968) (dictum); Willis v. Willis, 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1964).
191 See note 186 supra.
192 Parker v. Rogerson, 33 App. Div. 2d 284, 307 N.Y.S.2d 986 (4th Dep't 1970), appeal
dismissed, 26 N.Y.2d 964, 259 N.E2d 479, 311 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1970), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 145, 149-50 (1970).
193 See note 183 supra.
194 Of course, the decision does affect plaintiff in that by suing in the supreme court
it may be denied costs of the action. See CPLR 8102.
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